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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-307-67

- 1 JUN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Draft Memorandum for the President on Future Actions in Vietnam (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:

a. JCSM-218-67, dated 20 April 1967, subject: "Force Requirements - Southeast Asia FY 1968 (U)"; JCSM-286-67, dated 20 May 1967, subject: "Operations Against North Vietnam (U)"; and JCSM-288-67, dated 20 May 1967, subject: "Worldwide US Military Posture (U)."

b. Draft memorandum for the President (DPM), dated 19 May 1967, subject: "Future Actions in Vietnam," which was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment.

2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the DPM. The DPM addresses two basic courses of action: Course A - adds a minimum of 200,000 men to the Southeast Asia commitment and includes major ground operations and intensified air and naval actions outside South Vietnam, especially against North Vietnam; Course B - limits force increases to no more than 30,000 men, avoids extending the ground conflict beyond the borders of South Vietnam, and concentrates the bombing on the infiltration routes south of 20°. The DPM generally implies that Course A reflects the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, Course A is an extrapolation of a number of proposals which were recommended separately but not in combination or as interpreted in the DPM. The combination force levels, deployments, and military actions of Course A do not accurately reflect the positions or recommendations of COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The positions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which provide a better basis against which to compare other alternatives, are set forth in JCSM-218-67, JCSM-286-67, and JCSM-288-67. Five major areas of concern have been identified in the DPM. They are discussed under the following headings:

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a. Objectives (Part I, Appendix A).

b. Military Strategy and Operations (Other than Air/Naval Operations in the North) (Part II, Appendix A).

c. Military Strategy for Air/Naval War in the North (Part III, Appendix A).

d. Domestic Attitude and Predicted Reactions (Part IV, Appendix A).

e. International Attitude and Predicted Reactions (Part V, Appendix A).

3. ~~(T)~~ Objectives. The preferred course of action addressed in the DPM (Course B) is not consistent with NSAM 288 or with the explicit public statements of US policy and objectives enumerated in Part I, Appendix A, and in Appendix B. The DPM would, in effect, limit US objectives to merely guaranteeing the South Vietnamese the right to determine their own future on the one hand and offsetting the effect of North Vietnam's application of force in South Vietnam on the other. The United States would remain committed to these two objectives only so long as the South Vietnamese continue to help themselves. It is also noted that the DPM contains no statement of military objectives to be achieved and that current US national, military, and political objectives are far more comprehensive and far-reaching (Appendix B). Thus:

a. The DPM fails to appreciate the full implications for the Free World of failure to achieve a successful resolution of the conflict in Southeast Asia.

b. Modification of present US objectives, as called for in the DPM, would undermine and no longer provide a complete rationale for our presence in South Vietnam or much of our effort over the past two years.

c. The positions of the more than 35 nations supporting the Government of Vietnam might be rendered untenable by such drastic changes in US policy.

4. ~~(T)~~ Military Strategy and Operations (Other than Air/Naval Operations in the North). The DPM favors Course B with inadequate analysis of its implications for conduct of the war in Vietnam. The strategy embodied in this alternative - largely designed to "make do" with military resources currently

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approved for Southeast Asia - would not permit early termination of hostilities on terms acceptable to the United States, supporting Free World nations, and the Government of Vietnam. The force structure envisaged provides little capability for initiative action and insufficient resources to maintain momentum required for expeditious prosecution of the war. Further, this approach would result in a significant downgrading of the Revolutionary Development Program considered so essential to the realization of our goals in Vietnam. It would also result in the abandonment of the important delta region on the basis of its being primarily a problem for the Republic of Vietnam to solve without additional external assistance. (See Part II, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

5. (C) Military Strategy for Air/Naval War in the North. The DPM stresses a policy which would concentrate air operations in the North Vietnamese "funnel" south of 20°. The concept of a "funnel" is misleading, since in fact the communists are supplying their forces in South Vietnam from all sides, through the demilitarized zone, Laos, the coast, Cambodia, and the rivers in the Delta. According to the DPM, limiting the bombing to south of 20° might result in increased negotiation opportunities with Hanoi. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that such a new self-imposed restraint resulting from this major change in strategy would most likely have the opposite effect. The relative immunity granted to the LOCs and distribution system outside the Panhandle would permit: (a) a rapid recovery from the damage sustained to date; (b) an increase in movement capability; (c) a reduced requirement for total supplies in the pipeline; (d) a concentration of air defenses into the Panhandle; and (e) a release of personnel and equipment for increased efforts in infiltration of South Vietnam. Also, it would relieve the Hanoi leadership from experiencing at first hand the pressures of recent air operations which foreign observers have reported. Any possible political advantages gained by confining our interdiction campaign to the Panhandle would be offset decisively by allowing North Vietnam to continue an unobstructed importation of war materiel. Further, it is believed that such a drastic reduction in the scale of air operations against North Vietnam could only result in the strengthening of the enemy's resolve to continue the war. No doubt the reduction in scope of air operations would also be considered by many as a weakening of US determination and a North Vietnamese victory in the air war over northern North Vietnam. The combination of reduced military pressures against North Vietnam with stringent limitations of our operations in South Vietnam, as suggested in Course B, appears even more questionable conceptually. It would most likely strengthen the enemy's ultimate hope of victory and lead to a redoubling of his efforts. (See Part III, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

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6. (~~TS~~) Domestic Attitude and Predicted Reactions. The DPM presents an assessment of US public attitude and assumed reactions to several occurrences. Its orientation is toward the risks involved in Course A. The difficulty of making accurate judgments in the area of public response is acknowledged, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concede that their appraisal is subject to the same degree of uncertainty that is inherent in the DPM. Nevertheless, they are unable to find due cause for the degree of pessimism expressed in the DPM. The Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly believe that the American people, when well informed about the issues at stake, expect their Government to uphold its commitments. History illustrates that they will, in turn, support their Government in its necessary actions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that there is no significant sentiment for peace at any price. They believe also that despite some predictable debate a Reserve callup would be willingly accepted, and there would be no "irresistible" drive from any quarter for unnecessary escalation of the conflict. (See Part IV, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

7. (~~TS~~) International Attitude and Predicted Reaction. There are several inconsistencies between the DPM and the published intelligence estimates. For example, from these intelligence estimates, there is no evidence that Hanoi is prepared to shun negotiation, regardless of the pressure brought to bear, until after the US elections. Also, it is estimated that US prestige will not decline appreciably if prompt military action is taken to bring the conflict to an early close. In the long term, US prestige would probably rise. The effect of signs of US irresolution on allies in Southeast Asia and other friendly countries threatened by communist insurgency could be most damaging to the credibility of US commitments. The DPM contains the view that there is strong likelihood of a confrontation between the United States and the CHICOMs or the USSR, as a result of intensification of air and naval operations against North Vietnam and/or a major increase in US forces in South Vietnam. Intelligence estimates do not support this contention. (See Part V, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

8. (~~TS~~) Impact on US and Free World Armed Forces. Curtailment of air operations in North Vietnam (as proposed in Course B) will undoubtedly have an adverse effect upon US and Free World Armed Forces in the field.

9. (~~TS~~) Most of the foregoing divergencies between the DPM and the stated policies, objectives, and concepts are individually important and are reason for concern. However, when viewed collectively, an alarming pattern emerges which suggests a

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major realignment of US objectives and intentions in Southeast Asia without regard for the long-term consequences. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not aware of any decision to retract the policies and objectives which have been affirmed by responsible officials many times in recent years (Appendix B). Thus, the DPM lacks adequate foundation for further consideration.

10. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

- a. The DPM does not support current US national policy and objectives in Vietnam and should not be considered further.
- b. There is no basis for change in their views on the major issues in the DPM. These views are adequately stated in recent memorandums and reinforced herein.
- c. The US national policy and objectives should be reaffirmed.
- d. The US military objectives for Vietnam as restated in JCSM-218-67 support current US policy and objectives.
- e. Implementation of Course B would serve to prolong the conflict, reinforce Hanoi's belief in ultimate victory, and probably add greatly to the ultimate cost in US lives and treasure.

11. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

- a. The DPM NOT be forwarded to the President.
- b. The US national objective as expressed in NSAM 288 be maintained, and the national policy and objectives for Vietnam as publicly stated by US officials be reaffirmed.
- c. The military objective, concept, and strategy for the conduct of the war in Vietnam as stated in JCSM-218-67 be approved by the Secretary of Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

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APPENDICES A AND B  
TO JCSM-307-67

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APPENDIX A  
DPN ISSUES

1. OBJECTIVES

1. Abstracts:

- a. DPN: (1) Proposed US objective is to permit South Vietnamese to choose own future; commitment ceases if SVN ceases to help itself.
- (2) No stated military objectives.
- (3) No stated political objectives.

b. JCS:

- (1) Support US objective as stated in NSM 288 - to guarantee independent noncommunist South Vietnam.
- (2) Military objective - make difficult RVN to cease direction of VC; deter VC/NVA;

2. Specific Issues:

NOTE: Bibliography on page A-8

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPN ADVERSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 US National objective - commitment	Our national objective - commitment - in Vietnam is only to see that the people of South Vietnam are permitted to determine their own future. This commitment ceases if the country ceases to help itself.  Our commitment is AID to:  - expel South Vietnamese mercenaries from South Vietnam, ensure that a particular person or group remains in power, nor that that power runs to every corner of the land. - guarantee that the self-chosen government is noncommunist. - insist that the independent South Vietnam remain separate from North Vietnam.	NSM 288, 27 March 1964, states the US objective in South Vietnam as follows: "We seek an independent non-communist South Vietnam. The US' National objective is to ensure an independent South Vietnam free of Communist subversion and able to determine its own government and national aspirations; ...".	JCS: 632-65 JCS: 218-67 JCS: 732-66
2 Military objectives in Southeast Asia	Both courses of action are developed without benefit of any statement of military objectives.  The implication is that the objective for Course A with the associated force augmentation is:  - to bring additional military pressure to bear on the enemy in the South while continuing to carry out our present missions not directly related to combating enemy main force units.  The implication is that the objectives for the associated bombing strategy are:  - to retaliate and to lift the morale of the people in the South. - to add to the pressure on Hanoi to end the war. - to reduce the flow and/or to increase the cost of infiltrating men and material from north to south.  The implied military objectives for Course B are to improve the negotiating environment and to stop infiltration.	Military objectives are:  - to make it as difficult and costly as possible for RVN to continue effective support of the VC and to cause RVN to make direction of the VC insurgency to defend the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Armed Forces in RVN and force the withdrawal of NVA forces. - to deter Government of South Vietnam domination, direction, and control over South Vietnam. - to deter the Chinese communists from direct intervention in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific and to be prepared to defeat such intervention if it occurs. ....	JCS: 218-67
Political Objectives for Southeast Asia	The political objectives stated are those submitted within the statements above regarding national objectives plus the following inferred political objectives:  - initiate a "real" drive to settle war. - lay groundwork for periodic peace probes with associated limitation of bombing. - seek possible compromise involving role in RVN for members of VC.	See Appendix B	A-1

APPENDIX A

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## **III. MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS (Other than air/naval operations in the North)**

**a. DBI:** The preferred strategy is essentially that of a continuation of current operations at the current level with forces currently approved. US combat troops will be removed from the Delta. Increase utilization of RVN and third-country forces in logistical support role in order to release available US forces for combat role. US efforts will be shifted from the pacification role with the ARVN assuming a greater responsibility in this area. Emphasis will be placed on seeking accommodation through reduction of pressures exerted in the North and possible future political role for the VC in the South.

**b. JCS:** The strategy recommended by the JCS emphasizes a significant and abrupt increase in military pressure with which the enemy cannot cope; maintaining momentum and initiative which will result in the destruction of the enemy main and provincial forces and their bases; providing an adequate security environment in which both ARVN and US forces can progress. Provide, through selected call up or reserves, forces adequate to conclude the war in Vietnam and to provide a more flexible and responsive worldwide military posture.

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SPECIFIC ISSUE	THE ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 Strategic Concepts	<p>DIA preferred strategic concept:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>e. Continue ground operations with forces currently approved.</li> <li>b. Make more efficient use of US manpower by: (1) Army achieving the Point; (2) Marines using prefabrication; (3) Army performing behind "locked up"; and (4) getting more support from Koreans or other third countries.</li> <li>c. Primary responsibility for pacification and RD rests with Vietnamese.</li> <li>d. Initiate a "cool" drive to settle war.</li> <li>e. Lay groundwork for periodic peace probes with associated limitation of bombing.</li> <li>f. Seek possible compromise involving role in RVN for members of VC.</li> </ul>	<p>The JCS recommended strategic concept:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Apply degree of pressure which is beyond enemy's capability to accommodate.</li> <li>b. Increase operations so as to create a secure environment in which RD can progress, coupled with military civic action programs in coordination with GVN programs.</li> <li>c. Provide adequate forces to conduct increased enemy pressure in vicinity of DMZ and to maintain the initiative throughout Vietnam by:           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Destruction of the enemy main force.</li> <li>(2) Create and destroy district and provincial guerrilla forces.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	JCS 218-67
2 Reserve Callup	The DIA preferred concept of operations, course E, does not include the calling up of the Reserves.	The JCS have recommended a selective callup of Reserves in order to more effectively fulfill US worldwide commitments while conducting the war in Vietnam so as to terminate it at an early date on terms favorable to US interests.	JCS 288-67
3 Strategic Flexibility	The DIA does not consider the requirement for strategic flexibility; and therefore provides no option for further military pressure or influence in the event the conflict either continues on the present pace for a protracted period or takes a turn for the worse. Further, military operations in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam are specifically excluded. ... If COURSE B is chosen, it must be made clear to political and military leaders alike that the troop limit is firm and, short of an imminent military defeat, will not be breached -- the objective will be to make progress, even though it be slow..."	<p>The concept recommended by the JCS does not provide the resources for a prompt application of military pressure against South Vietnam but does provide forces to improve the US military capability to sustain its commitment to defend South Vietnam and to assist the government of Laos in its defense of its northern borders against Communist aggression.</p> <p>Specifically, the proposed posture would commit the bulk of the US combat forces to the defense of South Vietnam and would leave relatively few forces available for operations elsewhere in the periphery of South Vietnam. More importantly, this posture provides the US with the essential capability of strategic flexibility.</p>	JCS 288-67
4 Progress of RD Efforts	The National Liberation Front (NLF) continues to control large parts of South Vietnam, and there is little evidence that the revolutionary development programs is gaining any momentum.	<p>The fate of the RVN program hinges on the degree of security which is offered to the population and expanding government apparatus. Without assurance of a secure environment, the people will not go forth and even hostile to the efforts of the effort, and no real progress can be achieved.</p> <p>Progress has been about as good as can be expected from a government which at the start was weak administratively, lacked popular support and has been deeply involved in war throughout its existence and suffers from competing programs sponsored by various (S)VN agencies.</p>	JCS 288-67

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SPECIFIC ISSUE	DRAFT ADDRESSEES OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCSC/CNS ON INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	
		REFERENCES	COM
Infectiveness of PAVN Forces	"... If we are now past the cross-over point, the military job is done without true total forces... if the long run combat is terror "from the bushes, can the military job be done even with them?"	While there is no single measurable measure of the overall effectiveness of the PAVN, there are certain useful indicators which reflect a trend toward infectiveness. A recent GDB (GA) comparative analysis covering a thirty-period indicates that the PAVN is more effective than the ARVN by only about 25 percent. It is however weighed by relative unit strengths in terms of enemy KIA/KIA figures. While before measured unit strengths and comparative enemy and friendly unit strengths must continue to be evaluated, the real benefit will be realized gradually, and will be more difficult to do so, in the successful conduct of the war and to a lasting peace in postwar Vietnam.	CM-2377-67
Dimensions of cross-over point	"... If we are now past the cross-over point" control the military job is done without true total forces... if the long run combat is terror "from the bushes, can the military job be done even with them?"	There has been some speculation that the "cross-over point" has occurred. Figures on enemy losses, recruitment capability, infiltration rates, and infiltration capability are tenuous and are based on so many variables that a firm point cannot be established. The utility of an indicator as a benchmark is a "cross-over point" in the analysis of progress in warfare is highly questionable. The "cross-over point" in the trend in enemy losses versus input is important. In addition, the significance can be attached to an apparent cross-over Point and Cagayan. Requirements must continue to be determined by the tasks to be accomplished and the enemy residual capability.	
7	"In 'total war' in the Delta between the US and the North Vietnamese military units is going well," and "correctly, the 'other war' does not exist; it is still not going well."	Exception is taken with the implied distinction that two wars are being fought in Vietnam. This implied distinction is particularly germane to the question of the appropriate utilization of forces. The interrelationship of the military and other war categories is particularly germane to the question of the appropriate utilization of forces. The interrelationship must be examined. The economic, psychological and political efforts of the same war, whether they are directed at the internal and essential parts of the same war, or whether they are directed outside of South Vietnam. This is especially true in the field of revolutionary development and nation-building which require military actions to provide the requisite security for a successful program.	
Utilization of forces	"In addressing a possibly more efficient utilization of forces, the next step is that one of the additional divisions could be eliminated if the PAVN had withdrawn the Delta, and certain of the other ground force units could be withdrawn if the RVN Marines ceased guerrillaistic activities." In addressing the proposed employment of additional forces, the CNS notes: "The question arises whether US combat troops should be devoted to participation or to the Delta. Are these two matters to be interrelated?"	This statement is also indicative of an effort to separate the war into two, and direct other war categories. Although some US Army and Marine combat units are directly participating in providing ID security at the village level, the pre-ordained participation in providing ID security at the village level,駐軍 and assist in pacification is an advisory role.	

III. MILITARY STRATEGY FOR AIR/NAVAL WAR IN THE NORTH

1. Abstracts:

a. DPM

(1) Further bombing in the North will be ineffective.

b. JCS

(1) The US should conduct a comprehensive and coordinated air/naval campaign designed to achieve well defined objectives.

(2) Concentration of bombing on the "funnel" would not be militarily advantageous.

(3) DPM represents a major change in US policy, reversing the trend of gradually increasing pressures in the North.

(4) The air/naval campaign can be controlled independently of other elements of the war, to permit most effective application of this power in order to achieve objectives.

2. Specific Issues:

BASIC ISSUES	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CIA OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 Relationship of Air/Naval War in the North to the Postulated Courses of Action.	Course A - Further expansion of the bombing program in the North, accompanied by buildup of forces and increased military activity on the ground, especially outside of South Vietnam. Course B - Limit force increases; concentrate conflict within the borders of South Vietnam; and concentrate the bombing on the infiltration routes south of 20°.	The air/naval campaign against North Vietnam can be controlled independently of the other elements of the war. However, since all elements of the war are interdependent and complementary in their contribution toward attainment of the national objective, any reduction in the recommended force levels for South Vietnam would place an increasing premium on the pressures against North Vietnam. The direct linking of a reduced force level in South Vietnam with reduced air/naval actions outside South Vietnam, as discussed in Course B, appears doubly invalid as a concept.	CR 2371-67
2 Value of continued bombing in North Vietnam.	No major military targets remain to be struck in the North, excluding the port areas. It now appears that no combination of actions against the North short of destruction of the regime or occupation of North Vietnamese territory will physically reduce the flow of men and material below the relatively small amount needed by enemy forces to continue the war in the South. Our effort can and does have severe disruptive effects, which Hanoi can and does compensate for. There continues to be no sign that the bombing has reduced Hanoi's will to resist.	The United States should conduct a comprehensive and coordinated air campaign which will: (1) bring military pressure on its internal war-supporting resources; (2) effectively impede the importation of external resources; and (3) increase interdiction of infiltration routes in North Vietnam. Such an air campaign should produce results which outweigh risks - political and military (2) provides greater effectiveness, less cost in the long run, and clearer signal of US determination to Hanoi and the rest of the world; (3) should not cause CHICOM intervention; and (4) will cause mounting pressures on North Vietnam's economy and military efforts. The most significant action yet to be accomplished that would have the greatest impact on the RVN ability to continue the war is to obstruct and reduce importation of war-supporting materials.	ICM 268-67 JCSN 268-67 JCSN 256-67 CN 2371-67
3 Hanoi insensitivity to increased bombing pressures.	With respect to added pressure on the North, it is becoming apparent that Hanoi may already have written off actions short of occupation or annihilation. They can and will hold out so long as a prospect of winning the attrition in the South exists.	Granted that Hanoi has taken many measures to overcome the effects of the air campaign, nevertheless, an incentive to stay on should make it difficult for Hanoi to continue the war. The outcome of the war, whether by air campaign or other means, will depend upon the cumulative efforts of all US agencies. At this time the North Vietnamese willingness to continue the war is highly questionable. North Vietnam is willing to sacrifice all men and lives that might be lost when they could be saved by a negotiated settlement. This is, however, no indication that the North Vietnamese regime would make any reciprocal military desecration in return for a bombing reduction.	MTP 11-11-67; DIA/CIA Doc #2139/AR-4 EAM 358
4 Military Value to COMUSMACV of Shift in Bombing Effort	The lowest "escalating" on infiltration can probably be achieved by concentration on the North Vietnamese "funnel" south of 20° and on the Trail in Laos. This shift, despite possible increases in anti-aircraft capability in the area, should reduce the pilot and aircraft loss rate by more than 50 percent. The shift will, if anything, be of negligible military value to General Westmoreland while taking some cut out of the popular effort in the North. This shift of bombing strategy can, to military advantage, be made at any time, but the shift should be time to maximize the chances of getting Hanoi to negotiate.	In recent months the majority of our bombing effort in North Vietnam has been directed at Route 9 between Lai and Qui Nhon. About 7,000 sorties were flown in these areas as example in March. In April, about 3,500 sorties in the remainder of North Vietnam. A shift in bombing effort to northern North Vietnam would provide some increase in available forces against North Vietnamese forces infiltrating into South Vietnam. However, a complete shift of effort would permit North Vietnam to concentrate its air defense system in those areas being attacked, thus increasing our losses in those areas. Buildup in the northern part of North Vietnam and stockpiles there would be immune from attack, thereby making this problem much easier and releasing personnel and equipment for increased efforts in infiltration of South Vietnam. Some additional sorties in southern part of North Vietnam might destroy some infiltrating targets, but this would be more of a them reaching this area due to COMMUSMACV. The net result would not be of positive military value to COMUSMACV. The shift in effort will reduce air losses at least initially until the relocation of enemy air defense systems into South North Vietnam.	CR 2371-67; DIA/CIA Doc #2039/AR-4 SRR 10-1-66

BASIC ISSUES	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/JCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
5 Mining Operations in North Vietnam	<p>The program they /CINCPAC &amp; COMUSMACV/ propose . . . would invoke the virtual certainty of irresistible pressures . . . for the blockage of rail, road, and sea imports . . . for mining of the harbors against Soviet and other ships.</p> <p>Why not escalate the bombing and mine the harbors . . . meaningfully constrict the flow, and that it would bend on the gamble that it would limit enemy action in the South, and that it would bend limiting enemy action in the South, and that it would bend Hanoi? The answer is that the costs and risks of the actions must be considered. These are cost in US lives, cost in domestic and world opinion; and most importantly, the likely Soviet, Chinese, and North Vietnamese reaction. /</p>	<p>The effectiveness of LOC interdiction cannot be greatly improved until deep-water ports are closed or neutralized. It will then be worthwhile to intensify the interdiction effort against other LOC's in North Vietnam.</p> <p>Mining of NVN deep water ports will disrupt the major avenue of basic economic and military support and force the enemy to overload more vulnerable routes by rail, road, and shallow draft coastal and internal waterway shipping. Mining of internal waterways will create choke points, backup traffic and saturate alternate routes. (See also Section V, Paragraph 4, this column.)</p>	CM 2377-67 JCSM 288-67

APPENDIX A

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IV. DOMESTIC ATTITUDE AND PREDICTED REACTIONS

1. Abstracts:

- a. DPK:
  - (1) Escalation makes war more unpopular and people want out of it one way or another.
  - (2) Reserve buildup will be a divisive issue.
  - (3) Force buildup will create pressure for war expansion.
- i b. JCS:
  - (1) The majority of the people, although frustrated with an apparently endless war, still want their country to honor its commitments.
  - (2) In the long-term, Reserve buildup is more likely to be a consolidating force than a divisive one.
  - (3) The American people have learned to accommodate to selective application of military power.
- 2. Specific issues:

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DMR ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 Disatisfaction with progress of the war	The Vietnam war is unpopular, and becoming increasingly more so as it escalates. Most Americans do not understand the war. All of them want the war ended and expect their President to end it successfully. Or else.	The vocal but minor segment of the American people who oppose US policy in Vietnam, both those in public and private life, do not speak for the entire population. It is more probable that the vast majority of the population want to see their country fulfill its international obligations. An American characteristic is to face up to a job and get it over with as soon as possible. Accordingly, since no end can be seen to involvement in Southeast Asia, there is naturally a certain amount of frustration. However, the sense of frustration is not severe enough to support a "Peace at any price" attitude.	CM 2377-67
2 Political difficulty of Reserve buildup	Although increased force requirements will not lead to massive civil disobedience, a request for Congressional authority to call Reserves will lead to a divisive debate.	Call-up of Reserves, a major increase in deployed forces, recommitting of heavy sea ships, and an increase in air/naval pressures against North Vietnam would unquestionably evoke an immediate outburst from the vocal minority that already opposes US policy. However, in the long term, these actions should have a positive effect on the majority. National pride, spirit of unity, and patriotism should be aroused when the Government further demonstrates its resolve and determination to bring the war to an acceptable termination in the shortest feasible time.	CM 2377-67
3 Pressures for stronger action outside South Vietnam	The "hawk" faction will almost certainly impose irresistible pressures for stronger action outside South Vietnam.	President Johnson and other responsible officials have stated repeatedly that we want to avoid a wider war, and both the General public and Congress are well-conditioned to the policy of selective application of military power. Therefore, Reserve buildup and/or controlled intensification of on-going actions (e.g., air/naval operations against North Vietnam) would not be expected to cause pressure for irresponsible escalation or for spreading the war beyond its current bounds. On the contrary, force buildup and graduated intensification of effort should quell the opinion held in some quarters that the United States is embarked on a "No-win" strategy. As a result, this should tend to discourage demands for higher levels of action than are militarily appropriate, or for withdrawal of US forces under less than honorable conditions.	CM 2377-67

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APPENDIX A

941103-210

V. INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDES AND PREDICTED REACTIONS

1. Abstracts:

a. DBI:

- (1) North will not negotiate until after US elections.
- (2) International bombing will damage US形象.
- (3) Increased forces actions will bring US closer to war with China and/or Russia.
- (4) Minibus, Railroads might cause severe problems.
- (5) The USSR is the most probable space player.
- (6) A post hostilities role for the VC should be explored.

b. JES:

- (1) Appropriate application of power might well bring about negotiations at any time.
- (2) International bombing will not qualitatively change US international image and position.
- (3) Some action on Soviets nor China are likely to seek a major confrontation with the US over actions the US have recommended to Hanoi.
- (4) The USSR might become a "peace player" but US should not place primary reliance on this scheme.

2. Specific Issues:

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPN ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE US/CNS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCE
1 Incentive for Hanoi to negotiate	Hanoi probably has decided not to negotiate until after the November 1968 US elections. Neither continuation of our current methods - policy or increased force levels and actions against the North are likely to change their minds.	There is no factual basis for estimating a timetable nor of identifying the critical judgement concerning what would be accepted to negotiate. However, the combination of pressure - lack of successes in Sino-American negotiations, the combination of burden in RVN and constant reminders of US power and determination will force Hanoi to accept negotiations. Air/naval operations against RVN may be important bargaining points, because this is where the US has best control of intensity level. A large amount of force applied in a short period of time would be more likely to induce negotiation than would gradual escalation, since that would be more difficult to accommodate.	JES 288-67 ON 2377-67 SNTS 10-12-65
2 International reaction to bombing	The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 100,000 people in a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one. It could potentially produce a costly distortion in the American national consciousness and in the world image of the United States.	World reaction would generally follow the pattern already established for past expansion of air operations over RVN. Focus of criticism of the US would be more vocal in their reactions, but overall reaction would not constitute a sharp departure from attitudes concerning the bombing unless we were to undertake massive destruction of RVN, i.e., for publicity, and our actions as an indication of determination. Perhaps, if the US were to do some other international organization, there might be a move to condemn the US or to some other international organization. Some nations may be moved to provide additional assistance to RVN, but, save for those powers now providing it, no additional military support is likely.	SNTS 10-12-65 ON 2377-67 SNTS 11-11-67
3 Effect of increased US determination	Increased force levels and actions against the North are likely to get us to even deeper in Southeast Asia and into a serious confrontation, if not war, with China and Russia.	It is estimated that the Soviets are not prepared to resort to strategic and direct threats of general war as a means to protect RVN or to preserve Soviet face. It is somewhat likely that they will respond to the current expanded bombing program by providing additional quantities and perhaps new types of weapons and equipment. Beyond supplying equipment, they could take certain other actions to warn the US. For example, they might believe that the provision of nuclear weapons or of crews for defense equipment or possibly aircraft, would serve as a warning without leading to serious confrontation.	ON 2377-67
4 Strike/Blockade reaction to making Hanoi	Making the harbors would place Moscow in a particularly galling dilemma as to how to preserve the Soviet position and prestige in such an embarrassing place. They might, but probably would not force a confrontation in Southeast Asia, but they might consider some action in Korea, Turkey, Iran, the Middle East or, most likely, Berlin.	It is estimated that Chinese communists would provide a minor troop presence to RVN under these conditions: (1) If requested by RVN; (2) If there were a major ground invasion of RVN and/or (3) If the Blockade resulted in damage to RVN's economy.	ON 2377-67

APPENDIX A

A-7

24 03-211

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPA ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF US AND CUBA ON INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
"Soviet Peace Negotiators"	If we should decide to start our bombing strategy, we should inform the Soviets publicly and make the shift without fanfare; then Moscow would almost certainly release all information targets had been destroyed, might urge Hanoi to seize the opportunity to desecrate. Without having received an ultimatum, Hanoi would be in a better posture to answer favorably.	The genuineness of Soviet arbitration of course would be determined by how they viewed their own interests at the time. It may be that the war is advantageous to the USSR; it may be that the USSR's interest in the conflict has been diverted from the US, both domestically and with its allies. It has been a divisive factor for the US as well. The bombing of RVN constitutes a continuing approach to the US. The US may undertake one course since it is unable to protect a small ally between a serious confrontation which would force the Soviets to do more to gain by playing the Soviets off against each other. On balance, the Soviets probably can scarcely be considered unbiased arbiters; however, the US should use extreme caution in its reliance on this communication link with Hanoi.	SITE 11-11-67
"Particularities accommodation of VC"	"...to lay the groundwork by period: peace probes, perhaps suggesting secret talks associated with limitation of bombing and with view to finding a compromise involving, later also, a role in the South for members of the VC."	If we are to avoid the danger of winning the war and then losing the peace in requiring the international community to make a commitment to the VC which is not the national line only on a rehabilitate basis. There are severe pitfalls in secret talks with the VC, including the following: (1) This would tend to reduce demands the nature and practice of the RVN, and, conversely, grant the VC advantages the nature and practice of the RVN. (2) It could lead to inclusion of a communist party in the political structure of RVN, and possibly the formation of a coalition or "Popular Front" between the RVN and the aggressor; (3) It would tend to take the communists left to structures from which they could continue their campaign; (4) It would create the impression of weakness and lack of resolve on the part of the US.	JSP 792-66

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7. JSP-380-67, 18 May 1967, "Worldwide US Military Posture."
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9. DIA/CIA/DOC #s-238-42-A, March, 1967, "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam"
10. SITE 13-12-65, 10 December 1965, "Probable Communist Reaction to a US Course of Action"
11. SITE 10-1-65, 4 February 1965, "Probable Effects of a Proposed US Course of Action on RVN Capability to Support the Insurgency in South Vietnam."
12. SITE 11-11-67, 1 May 1967, "Soviet Attitudes and Intentions toward the Vietnam War."

APPENDIX A

A-8

94103-212

**APPENDIX B**  
**ANALYSIS OF US OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM**

**ABSTRACT**

**I. OBJECTIVES**

A. DPM: The time has come for us to eliminate the ambiguities from our military objectives - in Vietnam. Two principles must be adhered to and followed and actions brought in line with them: (1) Our commitment is only to see that the people of South Vietnam are permitted to determine their own future; (2) This commitment comes if the country chooses to help itself.

B. NSAM 268: We seek an independent, non-communist South Vietnam. (16 March 1968)  
C. JCSW 22B-67: US military objectives are: (1) to make it difficult and costly as possible for RVN to continue effective support of the VC and to cause RVN to cease direction of the VC insurgency; (2) to defeat the RVN and achieve Vietnamese forces in SVN and force the withdrawal of RVN forces; (3) to extend our position and to expand our influence; (4) to deter the Chinese communists from direct intervention in Southeast Asia; and otherwise and to be prepared to effect such intervention if it occurs.

II. COMPARISON:  
The current US objectives as redefined by the DPM and the realization of the important stakes that the United States and the Free World have in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. The objectives in the DPM, on the other hand, are narrowly construed and do not reflect the real stakes involved. They could hardly set the course for our effort in SVN. In short, they tend to place an unduly incomplete rationale and a negative tone to our presence in SVN.  
In general, JCS military objectives do respect the large majority of pronounced political objectives. There is some difference between the JCS military objectives and those of Defense objectives in line items 13 and 17.

SOURCES	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PROMULGATED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE			REPORTED IN JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Refer to Military Objectives in JCSW 22B-67 above)				
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	CRU 1	CRU 2	CRU 3	CRU 4
1. (a) US reply to 17-Motion Appeal on Vietnam - 8 April 1965 (Department of State Bulletin, 26 April 1965)	a. The Government of South Vietnam has requested the help of the United States in its defense against its enemies. In fulfillment of our long-standing commitment we have done what we can to help. We will continue as long as we can to help. We will not, however, do more than we need to help the Government and People of South Vietnam, and we threaten no regime.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2. Address by President Johnson of the Joint Economic Policy Statement, 26 April 1965 (Department of State Bulletin, 26 April 1965)	b. Peace in Southeast Asia demands an independent South Vietnam - security guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others - free from outside interference - tied to no alliance - a military base for no other country.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA*
	c. We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	d. Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves other than that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Yes	NA	NA	NA
	e. In recent months attacks on South Vietnamese were stepped up there, a terrible war was waged for us to become ever more involved in it. We did it for a change of government, and to do a change in what we believe that purpose requires.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Yes	NA	NA	NA
	(1) We do this in order to show down expression.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Yes	NA	NA	NA
	(2) We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Yes	NA	NA	NA
	(3) And we do this to convince the leaders of South Vietnam - and all who seek to share their compact - of a simple fact:	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA
	(a) We will not be defeated.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA
	(b) We will not grow tired.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA

\* Not Applicable

Appendix B

941103-213

SOURCES	CHARACTERS AS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED BY ITS OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE					(Excluded by JCS MILITARY COMPTD IN JCS-6, G, Above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	CIVIL 1	CIVIL 2	CIVIL 3	ON 1	ON 2
	(e) We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a neutrality agreement.	x	x			x	x	x	yes	yes
	(f) We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the current road to peace.	x	x			x	x	x	yes	yes
	c. I would hope that the Secretary General of the United Nations would use the prestige of his great office and his deep knowledge of Asia to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	na	na
	d. For our part I will ask the Congress as soon as it is in session to appropriate the funds we need. All other industrialized countries have done that. I feel in this effort to replace the Soviet Union, I will succeed. The task is no more than to furnish the home and enterprises of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	na	na
3. (U) Statement by President Johnson - 87 April 1 1965 (Report of State Bulletin, 17 May 1965)	We have not changed our essential purpose. That purpose is potential of expansion. That purpose is to resist aggression. That purpose is to avoid wider war.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	yes	yes
4. (U) Message to Congress from President Johnson - 13 1 June 1965 (B. Doc. 196, 88th Cong., First Session)	For our part, I propose that we expand our own economic assistance to South Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. I propose we start now to make available our share of the money needed to harness the resources of the entire Southeast Asia Region for the benefit of all its peoples. This must be an international venture.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	na	na
5. (U) Foreign Affairs Outline No. 13 entitled "The US Role in Southeast Asia," Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State - June 1965	a. The nations of Southeast Asia, as with all other Asian states, should develop as free and independent countries according to their own views and toward increasingly democratic structures.  b. The nations of the area should not threaten each other or outside nations.  c. No single Asian nation should either control other nations or exercise domination either for the whole area or for any major part of it.  d. The nations of the Far East should maintain and increase their ties with the West in trade and culture as a major means of knitting together a peaceful and stable world.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	na	na
6. (U) Letter from Ambassador Goldwater to the President on the Security Council - 30 July 1965 (US Mission to the UN Press Release KG10)	e. The United States will continue to provide, in whatever measure and for whatever period is necessary, assistance to the people of the Republic of Vietnam in defending their independence, their sovereignty, and their right to choose their own government and make their own decisions.  f. The United States will continue to assist in the economic and social advancement of Southeast Asia, under the leadership of Asian countries and the United Nations, and will continue to explore all additional possibilities, especially in connection with the great projects taking shape in the Lower Mekong Basin.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	yes	yes

E-2

Appendix B

941103-214

SOURCE	OBJECTIVE AS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE						SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Based on Military Objectives in JCS 210-67 above)					
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOCULTURAL	ON 1	ON 2	ON 3	ON 4	ON 5	ON 6	ON 7	ON 8
	c. The United States will continue to explore, independently and in consultation with all parties, all possibilities to an honorable and durable peace in Southeast Asia.	x											
	d. The United States stands ready, as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world.	x											
7. (U) State Department Press Release No. 4 - 7 January 1966	Fourteen Points for Peace in Southeast Asia:  (1) The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia. (2) We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof. (3) We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it. (4) We would welcome multilateral discussions as President Johnson put it. (5) A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions. (6) Brand's Four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose. (7) We want no US bases in Southeast Asia. (8) We do not desire to retain US troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured. (9) We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice. (10) The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free deviation. (11) The countries of Southeast Asia can be normalized or neutral if that is their option. (12) We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars. (13) The President has said the Viet Cong would not have difficulty in accepting a peace agreement and that the Vietnamese should be allowed to make their own arrangements. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem. (14) We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.	x	x										
	6. (U) State of the Union Message of President Johnson to a Joint Session of Congress - 12 January 1966					x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

6. (U) In seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination or military alliance in Vietnam, the right for the principle of self-determination - that the people of North Vietnam should be able to choose their own course, choose its is free elections without violence, without terror, and without fear. The people of all Vietnam should make a free decision on the great question of reunification. This is all we want for South Vietnam.

01103-215

SOURCES	OBJECTIVE AS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED BY US OFFICIALS	SUPPORT FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION (Based on Military Committees in JCS 21B-57 above)						
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIAL/CIVIL	JOINT	ON 2	
	b. We have also made it clear - from Hanoi to New York - that there are no arbitrary limits to our search for peace. We stand by the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. We will meet at any conference table we will discuss any proposals - a point or 1% or 10% - and we will consider the views of any group. We will work for a cease-fire now or once discussions have begun. We will respond if others reduce their use of force, and we will withdraw our military from South Vietnam if a securely guaranteed right to shape its own future.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	
	c. And let me be absolutely clear: the day may become a reality and the month may become years, but we will stay as long as aggression commands us to battle.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	
9. (U) Remainder Declaration 6 Feb 1966	a. To prohibit independent VC role in future negotiations. b. To initiate massive active international support for our war efforts. c. To achieve a peaceful settlement as soon as possible. d. To support self-determination by free popular elections. e. To prevent aggression. f. To develop and expand handicraft and light industry. g. To expand rural electrification programs. h. To prevent infiltration. i. To achieve a social revolution through rural construction. j. To demonstrate humanitarianism through refugee relief.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	
	10. (U) Statement by Secretary Rusk Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations - 10 February 1966 (Department of State Publication 652)	a. We are in Vietnam because the Communists forced them on us despite our neutrality and because they do not want us to interfere in their internal affairs and our children will live in peace. b. What we are seeking to achieve in South Vietnam is part of a process that has continued for a long time - a process of preventing the expansion and extension of communist domination by the use of force against the weaker nations on the periphery of communist power.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes
	c. In North Vietnam we want to bring about a restoration of the conditions which existed before the events of 1954. We seek to restore the integrity of the settlement between the French Government and the communist forces under Ho Chi Minh. This settlement forms a part of the structures of arrangements that are the key to stability in the present-day world.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	
11. (U) Public Testimony by Secretary McNamara before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations - 20 April 1966 JCS 18 152-39	Our objective is not to destroy the communist government of North Vietnam. Our objective is to destroy the communist government of South Vietnam. Our objective is to destroy the communist government of Laos. Our objective is to destroy the communist government of Kampuchea. Our objective is to destroy the communist government of North Vietnam. We do not want to escalate our relationship with South Vietnam. We do not want to escalate our relationship with South Vietnamese. We do not want to obtain permanent base rights for US military forces in South Vietnam. It is not even to work toward a time when South Vietnam will be part of a military alliance in which the United States is a member. It is far more limited than any of those things. It is only to preserve for those Vietnamese people the right and the opportunity to shape their own destiny, to determine the form of their political institutions, to determine the form of their economic system, and in fact to maintain our alliances with them. It is only to maintain property, and we do not want to do anything more than a token of both our long-run and short-run military operations.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	

SOURCE	STATEMENT AS PUBLICLY PRESENTED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIAL/CULTURAL	OMI 1	OMI 2	OMI 3	OMI 4
<b>Essential Points of US Policy:</b>									
12. (C) State Circular Telegram to all diplomatic Posts (State 2054-7CS III 3530c) - 5 August 1966	<p>(1) The United States is absolutely determined to continue its support of South Vietnam's resistance to communism by negotiation, and will withdraw from this position unless aggression on one side and threats indicate it is in the interest of our allies to force a decision to determine its own future free of outside control.</p> <p>(2) The US bombing of North Vietnam is restricted to military targets which are being used by North to support the aggression against South Vietnam. The United States remains prepared to cease this bombing provided North takes reciprocal action.</p> <p>(3) The United States continues to offer for consideration (negotiations) a framework for the final settlement of the conflict in Indochina based on the essentials of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords.</p> <p>(4) The United States does not threaten the existence of the regime of North Vietnam. It holds no animosity toward the people of North Vietnam, and indeed the President has held out to their government the prospect of cooperation in economic development when peace has been restored.</p> <p>(5) The United States does not intend to initiate hostilities against North Vietnam, but we have repeatedly pledged to withdraw our troops from South Vietnam when its security and freedom of choice is assured.</p> <p>(6) The United States does not oppose the reunification of Vietnam. We support the right of self-determination through the free choice of the Vietnamese people. Likewise, the United States does not oppose the neutrality or independence of all the countries of Southeast Asia if that is their desire.</p> <p>(7) Our policy is stated: the United States seeks only to stop communist aggression; it is not affecting communists itself. We are in Vietnam to demonstrate the impracticality of aggression and to persuade the aggressor to seek peace in his own interest. We have come to the aid of South Vietnam, at its request and under the right of collective self-defense, in the face of a professed aggression on a territorial and population character. We believe that the United States' military actions must be limited to those areas where there is a clear chance of preventing North to harm its neighbors alone. The smaller nations throughout the world have a critical stake in this principle, and in the effort to maintain the integrity of South Vietnam.</p>	x	x	x	x	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
13. (C) Briefing by Secretary McNamara to the Cabinet - 25 August 1966	<p>US military objectives are threefold:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. To seek out and destroy the main units of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese.</li> <li>b. To undercut the infiltration of men and material from North Vietnam into South Vietnam.</li> <li>c. To provide a screen of security behind which the revolutionary development of South Vietnam can take place.</li> </ul>	x	x	x	x	Yes*	Yes*	Yes	Yes
						Yes***	Yes	Yes	Yes

- \* OMC objective includes a task to direct commanded forces in RVN rather than the Secher "break out and destroy" which together with the OMC objective to force the withdrawal of RVN forces, is an apparent difference from the Secher objective. Secher objective does not include forcing the withdrawal of RVN forces.
- + OMC objective supports the Secher objective but goes beyond it with tasks that obstruct the movement of material into RVN and tasks that the RVN forces must do to defend themselves. The first two tasks of the OMC objective focus on the RVN forces, while the last two tasks focus on the Secher objective. Secher objective focuses on the more limited task of impeding the flow of men and material from RVN into RVN.
- # OMC objective could be interpreted to mean that US forces have the prime responsibility for extending OVN control. However, the implementing tasks clearly indicate that the US forces assist the OVN in the RVN situation. Secher objective limits the US force objective to providing security so that the OVN may accomplish #/b.
- \*\* No Secher objectives have no parallel for OMC objective h.

Appendix B

B-5

941103-217

SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLISHED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE					SUPPORTED BY US MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Refer to Military Objectives in JCS-21B-67 above)					
		MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOCULTURAL	ONI 1	ONI 2	ONI 3	ONI 4	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
14. (U) Statement by Secretary McNamara to the Press in Saigon - 14 October 1966	The United States is not fighting to overthrow the communist regime in North Vietnam, nor is it attempting to destroy its economy. But the sole objective of all the South Vietnamese is to show their own political durability.	x	x						Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
15. (U) Manila Conference 25 Oct 1966	a. To restore peace in SVN and the rest of Asia. b. To preserve the territorial integrity of SVN. c. To reunify Vietnam by free choice of all Vietnamese. d. To reconcile all elements of Vietnamese society. e. To withdraw all foreign forces as RVN military and otherive forces are withdrawn, neutralization ceases and level of violence subsides. f. To achieve end of hostilities between which an effective guarantee against further aggression. g. To force RVN to abandon aggression. h. To modernize agriculture. i. To achieve durable land reform and land tenure system. j. To achieve economic prosperity through regional development. k. To overcome poverty, disease, illiteracy, social injustice. l. To create a SVN civil government based on honesty and justice.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
16. (U) State of the Union message of President Johnson to Joint Session of the Congress - 12 January 1967	a. We are in Vietnam because the United States and our allies are committed by the SEATO Treaty to "act to meet the common dangers" of aggression in Southeast Asia. b. We are in Vietnam because an international agreement signed by the United States, North Vietnam and others in 1962 is being systematically violated by the communists. That violation threatens the independence of all the small nations in Southeast Asia and the peace of the entire region. c. We are there because the people of South Vietnam have a right to remain non-communist -- if that is what they choose -- as North Vietnam has to remain communist.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
17. (U) Statement of Secretary McNamara before the House Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1968-72 Defense Program and 1968 Defense Budget.	a. At the President's direction, the policies and objectives of the United States Government with respect to the conflict in Vietnam had been stated by Ambassador Goldberg at the United Nations last September. Among the points he made were the following: (1) Our is a strictly limited aim. (2) We are not engaged in a "Holy War" against communism. (3) We do not seek to establish an American empire or a "sphere of influence" in Asia.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Yes*	MA	MA	Yes

Appendix B

B-7

94-103-219

SOURCES	CONFERENCES AS PUBLICIZED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Refer to Military Objectives in NSC 2015-67 above)			
		JOINTCOM	MILITARY	DEFENSIVE	SOCIOECON.	ON 1	ON 2	ON 3	ON 4
Department of Defense News Release 26-27 - 28 February 1967	<p>a. The complete cessation of supporting the war material sent South to help the anti-communist people of South Vietnam, the United States fighting on behalf of the anti-communist forces in South Vietnam, in the manner chosen by North Vietnamese in the quantities dictated by North Vietnamese infiltration routes most advantageous to North Vietnamese. North provides nothing in the position put forward by Mai Van Bo in Paris. It demands such a permanent cessation of United States policy as will continue to make North Vietnamese pay a heavy price for their aggression. This country will do what it can to stop the infiltration and the lives of those who resist that aggression unless something is done in return. It will stop the bombing in return for a reasonable de-escalation of military action by the March Vietnamese.</p> <p>b. None of these is our objective. Our objective is limited to securing for the anti-communist forces the right to shape their own destiny. Their right to choose their own political and economic institutions under no threat, no without the threat, the pressure from external sources.</p> <p>c. Now, since that is a limited objective, we should seek to accomplish it at the lowest possible cost to this nation, to the other side, in terms of dollars, but the lowest cost to our Vietnamese allies, of course, means we should take steps to avoid civilian casualties, to minimize the risk of increasing the conflict and thereby increasing the cost to us in terms of American lives, and this is the foundation of our bombing policy.</p> <p>d. Now since that is our objective, we sought to accomplish three things by the bombing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) To raise the morale of the South Vietnamese.</li> <li>(2) To either reduce the level of infiltration of men and equipment from North to South or to increase the cost of that infiltration.</li> <li>(3) To make clear to the political leaders of the North that they will pay a price so long as they continue to carry on in their aggression of the South.</li> </ul>	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
27. (U) Address by Ambassador Goldberg to the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, Tokyo - 26 February 1967	<p>a. The United States will negotiate on Vietnam only with the objective of ending the war and not merely to de-escalate.</p> <p>b. The United States sincerely seeks a political settlement rather than unconditional surrender, although it is not interested in negotiations with less than a full settlement in mind.</p>	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
28. (U) News Conference by Secretary Johnson in Washington, D. C. - 27 February 1967	<p>a. We have a very limited objective in Southeast Asia today - very very limited. It is never seeking to destroy the Government of South Vietnam, never seeking to overthrow the Government of North Vietnam, never seeking to impose our own government on them. We are not even seeking to establish relationships with the Chinese. We are not even seeking to establish relationships with South Vietnam in terms of which they will be our military allies in terms of which they will provide for us permanent military bases on the land mass of Southeast Asia.</p> <p>Our principal objective in North Vietnam is to provide the maximum deterrent to people who believe aggression pays, with a minimum cost to us and to them.</p>	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
29. (U) News Conference by President Johnson in Washington, D. C. - 27 February 1967	<p>a. Three basic US objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) An honorable peace that will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror or intimidation from the North.</li> <li>(2) A peaceful Vietnam - apply their scarce resources to the real problems of their people; combating hunger, ignorance, and disease.</li> <li>(3) A concrete demonstration that aggression across international frontiers or demarcation lines is no longer an acceptable means of political change.</li> </ul>	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
(U) Address by President Johnson to the House Select Committee - 15 March 1967									

SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PRORESSED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE						REPORTED IN JOINT MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Formed to Military Objectives in JCS 2-18-67 Annex)		
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOCULTURAL	ON 1	ON 2	ON 3	ON 4	ON 5
	b. Three purposes in selective bombing of military targets									
In North Vietnam:										
(1) To back our fighting men by destroying the enemy's sanctuaries.	x	x			x	x	x	x	x	yes
(2) To exact a penalty against North Vietnam for her flagrant violations of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	yes
(3) To limit the flow, or to substantially increase the cost, of infiltration of men and materiel from North Vietnam.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	yes
2b. (u) Dallas Communiqué - 21 March 1967	Defend freedom in South Vietnam and at the same time continue the earnest search for an honorable peace.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	yes
	25. (u) Statement to the Press by President Johnson in Washington, D. C., upon his return from the Geneva Conference (20-21 March 1967) - 22 March 1967	We shall persevere in our efforts to find an honorable peace. Until that is achieved, we shall of course continue to do our duty in Vietnam.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	yes

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Appendix B

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